Марина Одинцова - Институциональная экономика

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Примечания

1

Об использовании игр см. Приложение к главе 1.

2

Равновесие по Нэшу – это набор стратегий (одна для каждого игрока) такой, что ни один из игроков не имеет стимула отклоняться от своей стратегии.

3

Ситуация будет эффективной по Парето, если ни один из игроков не может улучшить свое положение, не ухудшив при этом положения другого игрока.