Дуглас Норт - Институты, институциональные изменения и функционирование экономики

Эффективные институты возникают в обществе, которое имеет встроенные стимулы к созданию и закреплению эффективных прав собственности. Но разработать модель подобного общества, в котором индивиды стремились бы только к максимизации личного благосостояния и не испытывали бы ограничительного воздействия других мотивов, трудно и, наверное, невозможно. Неслучайно экономические модели общества в теории общественного выбора превращают государство в нечто похожее на мафию — или, пользуясь терминологией этой теории, на Левиафана. Тогда государство становится ничем иным, кроме как механизмом для перераспределения имущества и дохода. Чтобы найти такие государства, не надо долго искать. Но, как мы пытались доказать в этом исследовании, теория общественного выбора безусловно не является всеобъемлющей теорией. Неформальные ограничения имеют значение. Нам нужно еще гораздо глубже разобраться в детерминированных культурой нормах поведения и их взаимодействии с формальными правилами, чтобы лучше понять все эти проблемы. Мы только начинаем серьезное изучение институтов. Это дает надежду. Может быть, мы никогда не получим однозначных ответов на все наши вопросы. Но мы можем двигаться в этом направлении.

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